Chen's election offers new opportunities for closer cross-strait ties, says Stanford University Fellow

The following is a speech delivered by Dr. Michel Oksenberg, Senior Fellow, Asia Pacific Research Centre, Stanford University, at PBEC 2000.

The DPP's leaders and members have few intimate links to the mainland. Its platform explicitly calls for Taiwan independence. Chen's historic accomplishment therefore understandably generates considerable nervousness in many quarters. Beijing fears the accelerated Taiwan drift from the mainland will culminate in its permanent political severance from the mainland and its international acceptance as a full and separate nation state. China's leaders also blame the United States for enabling the process to occur.

Many in Taipei are apprehensive that Chen's supporters will act vindictively toward the mainlanders who suppressed anti-KMT elements during the years of harsh dictatorial rule. Moreover, they fear that Chen will include within his cabinet and inner circle DPP hotheads whose rhetoric and actions could provoke a war with China. Such extremists within the DPP call for Taiwan acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or a level of military integration with the United States and Japan that would destroy the foundations of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations.

And many sober analysts in Washington worry that a Sino-American war over Taiwan could result from miscalculations in Beijing over American resolve to assist Taiwan in case of an unprovoked attack or missteps by a new Taipei administration that erroneously concludes it has unlimited American support. The consequences of a Sino-American war are almost too horrible to contemplate.

The unpredictable dynamics of escalation would be unleashed, with the inevitable unknowns about the extent, duration, and intensity of the confrontation. While the United States would prevail, the cost to the United States would be enormous, to China even more so, and the prosperous and democratic Taiwan of today would be destroyed in the process. A protracted or severe conflict would prompt financial flight from the region, end East Asian prosperity, wreck China's progress of the past 20 years, generate Japanese rearmament, and leave a legacy of Sino-American bitterness that would plague the world for generations to come.

Let me be clear. I think such a scenario is unlikely. Chen Shui-bian's election, in my opinion, need not appreciably add to the danger of conflict. Having garnered only 40 per cent of the total vote in comparison to James Soong's 37 per cent, Chen does not enjoy a broad mandate to alter Taiwan's policy toward Beijing. Further, international financial markets are likely to impose discipline upon his behaviour.

I believe that Chen Shui-bian's election offers new opportunities. With vision, calmness, and restraint, Beijing, Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo now have an opportunity to embark upon a more stable and beneficial path.

Rather than viewing Chen's election as a disaster, Beijing would be wise to recognise the opportunity his ascent could offer: an end to the protracted KMT-CCP civil war and the beginning of an expansion of cross-strait relations in such areas as telecommunications, shipping, and aviation. Chen has expressed this desire. Further, Beijing could test Chen's intentions by proclaiming a moratorium on its missile deployments across from Taiwan, in hopes that Chen would respond by deferring interest in acquisition of theatre missile defence (TMD) systems.

In short, Beijing should not immediately transfer to Chen Shui-bian all its frustrations and impatience that arose from Lee Teng-hui's ill chosen words and deeds. Chen's unassailable commitment to Taiwan's autonomy may give him greater political flexibility to expand economic, cultural, and technological relations. That is what he has said he wishes to do. And as that process unfolds, it may be possible to build trust and to reach compromises on the sensitive political issues that currently defy solution.

But the burden does not rest entirely on Beijing. Chen Shui-bian bears a pivotal responsibility to discipline his rhetoric (such as the way he refers to Taiwan's status in world affairs or whether he rejects the notion of ?ne China). Selection of his cabinet and close advisors will also reveal much about his judiciousness. For example, some high level DPP officials have advocated that Taiwan should seek weapons of mass destruction; they seek a level of Taiwan-American-Japanese military cooperation that would destroy Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. They treat American and Japanese security interests with disdain and in reality endanger Taiwan's security. International financial markets are likely to evaluate carefully the composition of Chen's cabinet and to judge whether it merits confidence.

Chen's seriousness, in short, can be judged not only by his behaviour toward the mainland but toward Washington, Tokyo, and other Asia-Pacific nations. Will he recognise his obligations toward the United States and others who have assisted the island to reach its advanced stage of development?

Washington and Tokyo have responsibilities as well. Taiwan's successful and orderly transfer of power merits great praise and support. But the embrace of Taiwan's new administration should be conditioned by his performance. Will Chen's rhetoric, policies, and appointments merit the external support that he needs? I believe Chen will meet the test. Nonetheless, rather than enacting the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which mandates increased Taiwan-American military cooperation or deciding now to provide Taiwan with significant new weapons systems, for example, it would seem prudent for Washington first to judge the temperament and disposition of its new partner. After all, one doesn't board a bus when there is a risk the driver may steer the bus off a cliff.

At the same time, Washington and Tokyo must remove any doubts in Beijing about their commitment to Taiwan. The American military posture in the Western Pacific must remain robust and ready for all contingencies. The United States and Japan should neither pressure Taiwan to enter into political dialogue with Beijing nor so indulge Taipei that it feels no need to do so. The urge for dialogue must come from within. It is up to Taiwan's leaders to conclude that the best way to protect the island's welfare is in cooperation with the mainland rather than in defiance of it.

In this sense, Chen's election has not altered the underlying strategic reality. The responsibility of the United States and Japan remains ?as for the past two decades ?to maintain a security architecture in the Western Pacific that preserves stability and enables the mainland and Taiwan to expands their contacts without jeopardising the security or affronting the dignity of either. How, when, and at what pace they do so is their business ?as long as they do it peacefully. B