 |
 |
|||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||
Advertise From the Chairman
|
BUSINESS
March 2001 Issue  B The Bush Administration and China  By Dr Eden Woon Although George W Bush's father is someone whom the Chinese know well and believe to have a positive view of U.S.-China relations, the election of George senior's son to the U.S. presidency produced some anxiety in China. This anxiety not only stems from the reaction to the usual rhetoric during a U.S. presidential campaign, when any candidate who expresses warmth to China would be severely attacked by his opponents, it also stems from perceptions of certain policy inclinations of George W. Now that the inauguration is two months old, what will President George W. Bush's China policy look like? The term "strategic competitor," which he coined during the campaign, should continue to be his administration's view of China. But does that necessarily mean it is an unfriendly relationship? We do not believe so, but it will not be a smooth relationship. Therefore, what will be the issues in U.S.-China relations in the next few years? During the Bush administration, six issues will dominate U.S.-China relations: strategic support; Taiwan; national missile defence; Japan; human rights; and trade. Strategic Support This administration will be more concerned than the previous one on how China supports the U.S. in the world stage, especially in the United Nations. The recent accusation that Chinese technicians were helping to upgrade the air defence system of Iraq in contravention of UN sanctions is the type that, if true, this administration takes very seriously. Proliferation problems dealt with in a quieter way by the Clinton administration will be dealt with less patiently by the Bush people. The U.S. will be harsher with sanctions if China transfers missile technology to Pakistan. The U.S. will be expecting more from China for help on the Korean peninsula peace process. The U.S. will also be less tolerant of illegal technology transfers to China. In short, the geo-strategic thinkers in the Bush administration, now without a Russian "bad guy" in the world, will be quite demanding of China on cooperation on what the U.S. believes to be critical geo-strategic and security issues. This, of course, can play positively if the Chinese leadership decides to cooperate more in the tense spots of the world, as they did during the Gulf War 10 years ago. But whether the Chinese behaviour on the world stage will be to the liking of the Bush administration will depend on how Beijing sees its own interests around the globe. Taiwan Although the Bush administration, as with many Americans, may sympathise with a democratic Taiwan, it will not consider Taiwan as an ideological issue, but as an issue which should be used as leverage in U.S.-China relations. In other words, any moves by the U.S. in favour of Taiwan will be considered in the context of U.S.-China relations. This is not to say that the U.S. will shy away from making decisions in favour of Taiwan for fear of offending China, but it does mean that Taiwan will be looked at strategically and as a chip in American dealings with China. Of course, more right-wing elements of the Republican Party would like to favour Taiwan more purely on a pro-Taiwan, anti-China ideological basis, but the mainstream will take a more pragmatic and strategic view. China should not take that as a sign of U.S. weakness on Taiwan, but Taiwan should not take for granted Bush administration support for everything it wants either. National Missile Defence This is probably the single most worrisome issue for this relationship. The defence establishment in the new Bush administration is firmly in favour of deploying this system. This deployment is strongly opposed by the Chinese leadership, who will react for certain with missile and nuclear developments that will introduce instability in the Asia-Pacific region and damage U.S.-China relations. It is very difficult politically for President Bush to now forego the development of NMD, and unless technical difficulties are insurmountable, or unless China and the U.S. somehow come up with a mutually acceptable compromise on NMD, this issue has serious consequences for long-term U.S.-China relational stability. Japan The Bush administration has made it clear that its Asian strategy will be centred on Japan. This of course irks the Chinese, just as the Japanese were irked that Bill Clinton seemed to have placed more emphasis on U.S.-China relations. How Japan behaves towards China in its alliance with the U.S., especially in Japan's dealings with Taiwan, will affect how China views U.S.-Japan alliance. If it looks at this with increasing alarm, then China will likely react by being cosier with Russia and being less helpful with resolving any Korean peninsula problems. If a balance can be sought with the three players, Japan, U.S., and China, then they could actually form a formidable stable triangle for Asia. Given the poor start the new administration has had with improving relations with Japan, especially after the sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel by the submarine USS Greeneville, Japan perhaps is not an immediate factor in U.S.-China relations. But in time, this will be a strategic issue that will concern China. Human Rights Human rights in China will continue to be a top priority domestic issue for the U.S. The special interest groups in the U.S. will not let this issue rest, and there will be constant pressure on the administration to deal with China forcefully on this issue. However, just as with the Taiwan issue, this dealing will not be from an ideological basis but from the basis of how to do it in the context of the overall relationship with China. The domestic political pressure in the U.S. will never allow the administration not to address this issue, but how and when to do it will be more flexibly handled. Unfortunately for the new administration, how to address the Chinese leadership ?always very sensitive on human rights criticism ?on the thorny Falun Gong issue will be the toughest problem the new administration will face on human rights, and it has to do so immediately. Trade Trade should be the issue that binds the two countries together. But this is now hampered by a lack of mid-level U.S. negotiators in place, by the inexperienced U.S. trade leadership for the moment, and by the current difficulties in Geneva over China's WTO accession. Differences of opinion on agricultural subsidies and on the speed of service sector opening are stalling the negotiations in Geneva without the U.S. taking the lead by giving them a push. Unfortunately, there is little time left for China to get into the WTO before the Permanent Normal Trade Relations vote comes up once again in June in Congress. The reason that it comes up again is because PNTR for China was passed last June contingent on China getting into the WTO. Since it may very well not be in the WTO by June, an annual review is necessary once again, and PNTR would have to be passed once again. And no one wants that to happen in an administration facing a split Senate and having no firm China or trade policy in place. We can only hope that the problems in Geneva can be resolved quickly with compromises by all sides and that China will get into the WTO soon. If that happens, trade will start playing a positive role in U.S.-China relations. We should not be so sanguine that trade will not cause any problems, but having more U.S. businesses wanting to take advantage of the China market and having disputes pushed to the multilateral arena of Geneva are good for the bilateral relationship between China and the U.S. Conclusion Four of the six possible bilateral problems between China and the United States can be categorised in the foreign policy/geo-strategic realm. The fifth is driven a great deal by domestic politics in the U.S. Only the final issue has a better than even chance that it will be a positive factor ?although that will be fraught with problems too. Hence U.S.-China relations will not be smooth. Much will depend on Chinese domestic politics, on how China views U.S., and on China's own view of its place in the world. The Bush administration foreign policy senior ranks are filled with strategic thinkers, and some may border on being strongly suspicious of China, but the ideologues are not in control of U.S.-China relations. The latter can also be said of U.S. Congress, who will play politics with China, but not in an ideological way. Cultivating good relations with China will be an ultimate goal of the Bush administration, but it will do so in a firmer, more consistent, and more realistic way. BDr Eden Woon is Director of the HKGCC. He served as China policy
adviser to then U.S. Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, during the Bush senior administration.
|
| About HKGCC | Member Services | Join Us | Contact Us | Advertising | Jobs |
|
The Chamber's Privacy Policy Statement Copyright © 1998-2008 The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. All Rights Reserved. |