As you know, in accordance with the historic PNTR legislation approved by the 106th Congress last year, when China enters the WTO - on terms as favourable or more favourable to U.S. interests than the terms of the historic US-China Bilateral Agreement on WTO accession concluded in November 1999 - the United States will extend to China full WTO member treatment in the form of Permanent Normal Trade Relations treatment of Chinese imports. The United States will in turn enjoy full WTO member privileges in its trade relations with China. With that, the requirement of annual renewal of standard U.S. import duties on Chinese products required under the Trade Act of 1974 will come to an end.

Each member of Congress who voted in favour of H.R. 4444 last year surely had his or her unique combination of reasons for doing so. But I believe at bottom most members chose to support PNTR in the belief that full WTO-member relations between our nation and China after WTO accession would provide two core benefits to the United States:

In addition, many members from both parties - legitimately, in my view - came to understand that the changes in state behaviour that WTO's most basic principles require of China - transparency in legal and regulatory policy, for example, or non-discrimination in the treatment of foreign and domestic goods and services - bear within them the seeds of enormously positive evolutionary changes in Chinese society, along lines that nearly all Americans would welcome and support.

American companies doing business with China, many of them now in their third decade of on-the-ground engagement, have a realistic appreciation of the weight of the tasks that WTO membership will soon impose on China's government and society.

They are optimistic about the elimination of market barriers and the reduction of trade-distorting practices under WTO, and thus about their enhanced opportunities for successful business with China.

Having in large measure defined American negotiating goals throughout the prolonged WTO accession negotiations, American firms also believe strongly in the necessity of China's realisation of its WTO commitments as defined in the nearly finalised accession documents.

American companies accept fully the legitimacy of Congress's concerns over China's ability to implement fully its WTO commitments, and understand the necessity of continuing close U.S. observation of China's efforts and achievements in living up to its WTO obligations.

At the same time, however, recognising the enormity of the challenges that the WTO presents to China, we feel strongly that the U.S. government and American businesses must commit themselves to extending the hand of cooperation to China as the PRC takes the path of responsible participation in the world trading system.

Effective bilateral cooperation on key elements in WTO implementation deserve equal American emphasis.

Today, American educational institutions are pitching in, providing long- and short- term training programmes for eager Chinese government and business officials, many of whom come to the United States at the Chinese government's expense for the purpose of imbibing American expertise in the operation of a WTO-compliant market-oriented economy.

During the extended debate over PNTR legislation last year, it was widely understood that many of those in the House who either opposed PNTR outright or who were uneasy about approval of H.R. 4444 were concerned that elimination of the annual NTR debate would deprive them of a legally mandated opportunity to bring to the Congress's attention those aspects of U.S.-China relations - and of China's internal affairs - that they felt needed to be aired in the interests of sound policy and faithfulness to their basic values. Thanks to the skill and creativity of key members of the House, most notably representatives Sander Levin and Doug Bereuter, whose names adorned a massive set of provisions included in the final bill, the Congress provided both for the extension of full WTO-member treatment to China upon its WTO accession and for the continuation of Congressional examination of certain questions of concern to members once the annual NTR debate drew to a close forever.

The NTR process offered an opportunity to re-emphasise essential points (or introduce them to new members) about the significance and the promise of expanded economic American opportunities accompanying China's rapid economic growth, and about the vital importance of healthy bilateral economic ties to the management of the entire, highly challenging, relationship between the United States and China.

In the absence of a forum for the discussion of our massive and far-reaching economic engagement with China, the Congress is likely to turn its attention to China increasingly over questions not normally analysed in economic and commercial terms. Ironically, we in the business community may find ourselves watching with concern if the centre of legislative interest in China shifts too rapidly and too completely away from the economic dimensions of U.S.-China engagement.