BUSINESS
August 2002 Issue

The U.S.-China Security Review
Commission
releases report
The report, the first of its kind, analyses U.S. national
security implications of the economic relationship between the U.S. and China; outlines
recommendations for Congressional action
The
U.S.-China Security Review Commission released its first annual report to Congress on July
15, 2002, analysing the growing U.S. economic relationship with China and its implications
for U.S. national security. The report calls for the development of a strong Congressional
consensus for U.S. policy towards China and provides a baseline for assessing changes in
U.S.-China relations in the year ahead. It presents a variety of findings that emerged
from the commission's year-long investigation into this relationship, and proposes 21
major recommendations to Congress to strengthen U.S. national security interests.
Following is the report's conclusion. The report does not represent the views of the
United States administration or the Congress at this point. Also, the report does not
represent the views of HKGCC and is provided for our readers for reference only.
Conclusion
"This first annual report of the U.S.-China Security Review
Commission has provided a comprehensive analysis of U.S.-China relations and a set of
findings and recommendations on the effects of the expanding economic ties with China on
U.S. national security, including our technological and industrial base. The ten chapter
narratives represent the judgement of the commission that the U.S.-China relationship
contains both hopeful and troublesome elements. We have tried to address both, but have
given greater emphasis to the problems and potential problem areas of the relationship in
keeping with the matters we were charged by Congress to address.
The trend lines in China's race to modernity bear close scrutiny. The
commission notes that many of the issues discussed in this report -- the growing trade
deficit, unprecedented investment flows, recurring political tensions, technology
transfers, restrictions on human rights, WTO compliance, proliferation of technologies
associated with weapons of mass destruction, military modernisation, and others -- have
been thorny issues in our relations with other countries from time to time.
China is unique for the U.S., in part, because the trade relationship and
the trade deficit have grown so large so quickly and because foreign investment flows into
China have been so massive, while, at the same time, political tensions over
proliferation, trade and other issues continue. China's military build-up continues and
appears aimed at projecting its influence and interests in Asia, human rights abuses
continue, and the Communist Party's authoritarian regime remains in place. Because China
is not a status-quo country, its size and rapid emergence as a magnet for foreign
investment and advanced technologies and the growth of its military capabilities have
sounded alarm bells in the U.S., and in other industrialised democracies. These concerns
would not be as strong as they have been if these same trends had developed in a country
with whom we have established a trusting relationship. Despite a decade of extensive
economic interactions and cooperation with China, that sort of relationship has not
developed and our efforts at confidence building measures (CBMs) have not materialised.
Our relations with China are complex, and in need of more careful study
and understanding. There is both promise and danger in the relationship and neither should
be ignored or minimised. In this fast-changing relationship, our policy, if unattended,
will lag behind events on the ground, thereby increasing chances of miscalculation and
damage to important U.S. interests.
Looking Forward
Congress created the U.S.-China Security Review Commission as a permanent
bipartisan independent commission because the issues involving Sino-U.S. relations are
neither short-term, nor static, nor simple. Looking forward, the commission believes that
special emphasis should be paid to the following issues:
 ― China's Compliance with its World Trade
Organisation Obligations -- The commission should continue to monitor China's record
of compliance with its WTO obligations and assess if shortcoming in compliance show a lack
of political will or institutional capacity. Because China's adherence to its WTO
commitments is in our national interest, the commission will conduct its own independent
analysis and compare it with analyses by others who will be addressing the same compliance
issue. This could also include an assessment of official and public opinion in China on
China's first year in the WTO.
― China's
Regional Influence -- The commission intends to evaluate shifts in manufacturing from
other Asian countries to China and shifts in U.S. trade and investment patterns from other
Asian nations to China, and the impact such relocations have on U.S. economic and security
interests in the region. Of particular interest is the growing economic, demographic and
communication linkages between Taiwan and the Mainland and the effects these expanding
interactions may have in ameliorating political tensions in cross-strait relations.
― China's
Economic Reforms -- China is burdened with domestic problems inherent in a legacy of a
centrally planned economy, its transition to a market-based economy and its integration
into the global economy. The commission should monitor China's management of its difficult
domestic problems, including social dislocations likely to emerge from WTO membership, a
weak banking system burdened by huge debts, widespread official and party corruption,
growing social and economic inequalities, an under-funded pension system and huge
unemployment, local protectionism, growing environmental and natural resource problems,
and much more. Students of China disagree on whether China can successfully manage its
economy and survive these enormous challenges.
― U.S.
Economic Transfers -- The commission should assess trends in out-sourcing
manufacturing to China by U.S. companies, including the shift of R&D facilities and
capabilities and the adequacy of U.S. export control statutes and regulations in helping
to manage this trend. We should continue to assess the degree to which the U.S. industrial
base, including the defence industrial base, is reliant on Chinese imports, especially
imports of advanced technologies. We should continue to assess the effects these transfers
have on U.S. employment trends, wages, and standard of living. Finally, we should assess
the validity of the so-called "hollowing out" phenomenon associated with the
relocation of manufacturing capacity to China, and measures to deal with it.
 ― Military Modernisation -- The
commission should continue to track the relationship between China's trade surplus with
the U.S., its access to U.S. capital markets and the inflow of U.S. foreign direct
investment on China's military modernisation program, its defence budget and spending, and
its strategy for challenging U.S. influence in Asia.
― Access to
U.S. Capital Markets -- The commission developed recommendations in this Report on
Chinese and other foreign companies seeking access to or trading their securities in U.S.
capital markets. We believe that more review and analysis should be conducted on the
adequacy of existing disclosure and transparency requirements with respect to the
identities, global activities and senior management of Chinese entities coming to or
already in our markets. Specifically, the commission should focus on the use of capital
markets to advance Chinese military modernisation programs, its proliferation activities,
and its relations with terrorist-sponsoring governments.
― Proliferation
of Weapons and Technologies of Mass Destruction -- The commission believes that
additional analysis is needed to assess China's role in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and related technologies and know-how to terrorist-sponsoring states and
the effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral sanctions or controls aimed at the
Chinese government in limiting or eliminating this practice.
― Bilateral
Cooperation Programs -- The commission should assess China's compliance with its
existing U.S. bilateral cooperation agreements, including the l979 Agreement on Science
and Technology, the agreement on exports of prison-made products, the Agreement on
Intellectual Property Rights, and to consider measures that should be taken to increase
compliance with them.
― Chinese
Perceptions in the Media and Education System -- The commission should evaluate
Chinese government efforts to shape and influence Chinese perceptions of the United States
through the control of the Internet and the print and electronic media in China. We
believe this should be coupled with a review of how China's educational system depicts the
United States, our history, values and behaviour.
― Patterns
of U.S. Investment and Trade in China -- The commission will continue to monitor and
assess year-to-year U.S. trade and investment patterns with China and the incentives and
others inducements China may be offering U.S. corporations to locate or relocate
production facilities and R&D to China.
― Energy
-- The commission will assess China's growing energy needs, how these needs shape its
relations with other countries, particularly oil-producing, terrorist-sponsoring states.
In addition, it will examine China's plans to diversify its energy sources, the
security-related inducements it employs to insure reliable sources and the plans it may
have to secure maritime and other lines of commerce and communications to bring reliable
supplies of energy to China's expanding economy.
― Trade
Deficit and Chinese Military Spending -- The commission should assess the relationship
between the U.S. trade deficit and China's expanding economy and its military spending.
Because China's financial data are unreliable, we will devote special attention to this
difficult but crucial issue in understanding China and Chinese military growth and
modernisation.
― China's
Activities in the United States -- The commission should also devote attention to
China's activities in the U.S., including its drive to acquire U.S. technologies, the
activities of PLA-affiliated companies operating in the United States, and the role that
Chinese students, researchers and scholars studying and conducting research in the U.S.
play in the transfer of U.S. technology and know-how to China."
Provided by the U.S.-China
Commission (USCC). The full report can be found on USCC's Web site at, www.uscc.gov/anrp02.htm |