Following is an article written by Chamber Director
Dr Eden Woon, which appeared in the March 2001 Bulletin.
The Bush
Administration and China
By Dr Eden Y Woon
Although George W Bush’s father is someone whom the
Chinese know well and believe to have a positive view of U.S.-China relations, the
election of George senior’s son to the U.S. presidency produced some anxiety in
China. This anxiety not only stems from the reaction to the usual rhetoric during a U.S.
presidential campaign, when any candidate who expresses warmth to China would be severely
attacked by his opponents, it also stems from perceptions of certain policy inclinations
of George W.
Now that the inauguration is two months old, what will
President George W. Bush’s China policy look like? The term "strategic
competitor" which he coined during the campaign should continue to be his
administration’s view of China. But does that necessarily mean it is an unfriendly
relationship? We do not believe so, but it will not be a smooth relationship. Therefore,
what will be the issues in U.S.-China relations in the next few years?
During the Bush administration, six issues will dominate
U.S.-China relations: strategic support; Taiwan; national missile defence; Japan; human
rights; and trade.
Strategic Support
This administration will be more concerned than the
previous one on how China supports the U.S. in the world stage, especially in the United
Nations. The recent accusation that Chinese technicians were helping to upgrade the air
defence system of Iraq in contravention of UN sanctions is the type that, if true, this
administration takes very seriously.
Proliferation problems dealt with in a quieter way by the
Clinton administration will be dealt with less patiently by the Bush people. The U.S. will
be harsher with sanctions if China transfers missile technology to Pakistan. The U.S. will
be expecting more from China for help on the Korean peninsula peace process. The U.S. will
also be less tolerant of illegal technology transfers to China. In short, the
geo-strategic thinkers in the Bush administration, now without a Russian "bad
guy" in the world, will be quite demanding of China on cooperation on what the U.S.
believes to be critical geo-strategic and security issues.
This, of course, can play positively if the Chinese
leadership decides to cooperate more in the tense spots of the world, as they did during
the Gulf War 10 years ago. But whether the Chinese behaviour on the world stage will be to
the liking of the Bush administration will depend on how Beijing sees its own interests
around the globe.
Taiwan
Although the Bush administration, as with many Americans,
may sympathise with a democratic Taiwan, it will not consider Taiwan as an ideological
issue, but as an issue which should be used as leverage in U.S.-China relations. In other
words, any moves by the U.S. in favour of Taiwan will be considered in the context of
U.S.-China relations. This is not to say that the U.S. will shy away from making decisions
in favour of Taiwan for fear of offending China, but it does mean that Taiwan will be
looked at strategically and as a chip in American dealings with China.
Of course, more right-wing elements of the Republican Party
would like to favour Taiwan more purely on a pro-Taiwan, anti-China ideological basis, but
the mainstream will take a more pragmatic and strategic view. China should not take that
as a sign of U.S. weakness on Taiwan, but Taiwan should not take for granted Bush
administration support for everything it wants either.
National Missile Defence
This is probably the single most worrisome issue for this
relationship. The defence establishment in the new Bush administration is firmly in favour
of deploying this system. This deployment is strongly opposed by the Chinese leadership,
who will react for certain with missile and nuclear developments that will introduce
instability in the Asia-Pacific region and damage U.S.-China relations. It is very
difficult politically for President Bush to now forego the development of NMD, and unless
technical difficulties are insurmountable, or unless China and the U.S. somehow come up
with a mutually acceptable compromise on NMD, this issue has serious consequences for
long-term U.S.-China relational stability.
Japan
The Bush administration has made it clear that its Asian
strategy will be centred on Japan. This of course irks the Chinese, just as the Japanese
were irked that Bill Clinton seemed to have placed more emphasis on U.S.-China relations.
How Japan behaves towards China in its alliance with the U.S., especially in Japan’s
dealings with Taiwan, will affect how China views U.S.-Japan alliance. If it looks at this
with increasing alarm, then China will likely react by being cosier with Russia and being
less helpful with resolving any Korean peninsula problems. If a balance can be sought with
the three players, Japan, U.S., and China, then they could actually form a formidable
stable triangle for Asia.
Given the poor start the new administration has had with
improving relations with Japan, especially after the sinking of the Japanese fishing
vessel by the submarine USS Greeneville, Japan perhaps is not an immediate factor in
U.S.-China relations. But in time, this will be a strategic issue that will concern China.
Human Rights
Human rights in China will continue to be a top priority
domestic issue for the U.S. The special interest groups in the U.S. will not let this
issue rest, and there will be constant pressure on the administration to deal with China
forcefully on this issue. However, just as with the Taiwan issue, this dealing will not be
from an ideological basis but from the basis of how to do it in the context of the overall
relationship with China. The domestic political pressure in the U.S. will never allow the
administration not to address this issue, but how and when to do it will be more flexibly
handled. Unfortunately for the new administration, how to address the Chinese leadership
-- always very sensitive on human rights criticism -- on the thorny Falun Gong issue will
be the toughest problem the new administration will face on human rights, and it has to do
so immediately.
Trade
Trade should be the issue that binds the two countries
together. But this is now hampered by a lack of mid-level U.S. negotiators in place, by
the inexperienced U.S. trade leadership for the moment, and by the current difficulties in
Geneva over China’s WTO accession. Differences of opinion on agricultural subsidies
and on the speed of service sector opening are stalling the negotiations in Geneva without
the U.S. taking the lead by giving them a push. Unfortunately, there is little time left
for China to get into the WTO before the Permanent Normal Trade Relations vote comes up
once again in June in Congress. The reason that it comes up again because PNTR for China
was passed last June contingent on China getting into the WTO. Since it may very well not
be in the WTO by June, an annual review is necessary once again, and PNTR would have to be
passed once again. And no one wants that to happen in an administration facing a split
Senate and having no firm China or trade policy in place.
We can only hope that the problems in Geneva can be
resolved quickly with compromises by all sides and that China will get into the WTO soon.
If that happens, trade will start playing a positive role in U.S.-China relations. We
should not be so sanguine that trade will not cause any problems, but having more U.S.
businesses wanting to take advantage of the China market and having disputes pushed to the
multilateral arena of Geneva are good for the bilateral relationship between China and the
U.S.
Conclusion
Four of the six possible bilateral problems between China
and the United States can be categorised in the foreign policy/geo-strategic realm. The
fifth is driven a great deal by domestic politics in the U.S. Only the final issue has a
better than even chance that it will be a positive factor -- although that will be fraught
with problems too. Hence U.S.-China relations will not be smooth. Much will depend on
Chinese domestic politics, on how China views U.S., and on China’s own view of its
place in the world.
The Bush administration foreign policy senior ranks is
filled with strategic thinkers, and some may border on being strongly suspicious of China,
but the ideologues are not in control of U.S.-China relations. The latter can also be said
of U.S. Congress, who will play politics with China, but not in an ideological way.
Cultivating good relations with China will be an ultimate goal of the Bush administration,
but it will do so in a firmer, more consistent, and more realistic way.
Dr Eden Woon is Director of the HKGCC. He served as China
policy adviser to then U.S. Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, during the Bush senior
administration.
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